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Abstract 
Three experiments investigate the role of expertise as a moderator of the relationship between 
implicit and explicit measures of attitudes. Prior research seems to suggest that greater expertise 
with an attitude object should lead to stronger implicit-explicit correlations. However, a 
cognitive view of expertise can also predict a weaker implicit-explicit relation. We lay out a 
framework that helps predict the directionality of the effect of expertise on the implicit-explicit 
relation and resolve that seeming contradiction. Our framework is based on the availability and 
accessibility of either detailed attribute information versus global attitudes in explicit attitude 
measures. We show that object-related and contextual factors differentially affect the availability 
and accessibility of these two different types of information for novices versus experts, thus 
determining how expertise moderates the implicit-explicit relation across different evaluation 
contexts.  
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The Effect of Expertise on the Relation between Implicit and Explicit Attitude Measures: 
An Information Availability/Accessibility Perspective  
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) developed by Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 
(1998) has become a prominent method for assessing automatically activated attitudes in social 
cognition. Since its inception, the nature of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude 
measures has been an ongoing interest in IAT research. Studies have reported diverging results 
for the correlation between implicit and explicit attitude measures, ranging from non-significant 
(e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001), through moderate (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998), to high (e.g., 
Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). In an extensive review, Fazio and Olson (2003) recognized 
the need for an integrative framework explaining these wide differences and proposed that 
“future research concerning the predictive validity of the IAT may benefit from the consideration 
of moderating variables” (p. 310).   
Scholars have begun building such a framework by investigating a series of moderators 
of the implicit-explicit relation, including attitude characteristics, situational factors, and research 
design aspects (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005; Hofmann, Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2005; Karpinski, 
Steinman, & Hilton, 2005; Nosek, 2005). As Nosek (2007) pointed out, our knowledge remains 
relatively limited with respect to the moderating role of stable individual differences on the 
implicit-explicit relation. The purpose of the present research is to contribute to the literature on 
the implicit-explicit relation by proposing expertise with the attitude object as a key individual 
difference moderating the relation between implicit and explicit attitude measures.  
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We develop a framework that accommodates two different predictions about the 
directionality of the effect of expertise on the implicit-explicit relation. Our framework is based 
on the notions of accessibility and availability of different types of information at the time of the 
explicit attitude assessment. On the one hand, greater expertise with an attitude object can lead to 
increased availability of detailed information (e.g., beliefs about specific attributes) upon which 
to base explicit evaluations; we argue that this process may lead to a lower implicit-explicit 
relation. On the other hand, expertise can also increase the chronic accessibility of global 
attitudes, thereby increasing the possibility that those attitudes will be used to make an explicit 
evaluation; we argue that this process may lead to a higher implicit-explicit relation. Our three 
experiments show that an object-related factor (object specificity) and contextual factors (type 
and number of evaluations) differentially affect the dominance of these two processes for 
novices versus experts. Thus, this research indicates that, depending on specific characteristics of 
the attitude object and its evaluative context, expertise may lead to either weaker or stronger 
implicit-explicit relations. 
Attitudes: Implicit and Explicit Measures 
Different theoretical approaches are used in current implicit cognition research about the 
attitude construct (Gawronski, 2007). The present research builds on the view of attitudes as 
object-evaluation associations, which conceptualizes an attitude as “an association in memory 
between a given object and a given summary evaluation of the object” (Fazio, 1995, p. 247). A 
person’s attitude toward the brand Mercedes, for example, can be represented by the association 
between Mercedes and evaluations such as bad/good, unpleasant/pleasant, as well as more 
affective evaluations such as dislike/like or hate/love. From a methodological view, there are two 
main approaches to elicit individual attitudes toward an object: explicit and implicit (Krosnick,     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         5
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005). The specific processes by which attitudes affect the measurement 
outcome differ according to the type of attitude measurement implemented (De Houwer, 2006; 
De Houwer & Moors, 2007). We review the features of each of those approaches below before 
discussing the relation between implicit and explicit attitude measures. 
Explicit Measures of Attitudes 
Explicit attitude measures (also referred to hereafter as explicit evaluations) constitute 
written or verbalized evaluations of attitude objects in a specific evaluative context (Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Commonly used explicit attitude measures include self-reports such 
as semantic differentials, Likert scales, and feeling thermometers (Krosnick et al., 2005). The 
standard conditions of implementation of these self-reports imply that the outcome of the 
measure (e. g. a “2” on a “1” to “7” dislike/like scale about the Mercedes brand) reflects a 
deliberative, controlled process in the form of a self-description provided by the respondent 
(Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2007) (Footnote 1).   
All along, researchers have been concerned about several potential problems with explicit 
methods to measure attitudes. Respondents may be unwilling or unable to report their own 
attitudes (strategic responding), and there may be a host of contextual variables that could 
influence their responses to the attitude questions at every stage of the responding process 
(Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). For 
this reason, a self-reported measurement outcome may or may not be highly influenced by the 
participant’s own attitude toward Mercedes. For example, a particular evaluation context could 
make accessible information other than a summary evaluation from memory (e.g., specific 
attribute evaluations of Mercedes in terms of design, engine power when comparing Mercedes to 
other brands). In addition, depending on the evaluation context, explicit attitude measures may     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         6
be affected by social desirability (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002) and self-presentational responding 
(Holtgraves, 2004). As a result of these effects, individuals may in some cases construct their 
explicit evaluations online (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In such situations, the self-reported, explicit 
attitude measure will have little or no relation with attitudes, defined as object-evaluation 
associations in memory.  
Implicit Measures of Attitudes 
Implicit attitude measures differ from explicit measures in that their measurement 
outcome is mostly affected by automatic processes (De Houwer, 2006; Ranganath et al., 2007).  
Some of the most important features of automatic processes are their uncontrollability, 
unintentionality, efficiency and speed (De Houwer & Moors, 2007). Over the last decades, a 
number of implicit attitude measures have been proposed (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Krosnick et al., 
2005). The measurement tool that has attracted most attention in recent years is the IAT, 
developed by Greenwald et al. (1998). In essence, the IAT compares response latencies in 
sorting tasks involving compatible and incompatible combinations of attitude objects (e.g. 
flowers vs. insects) and valence attributes (e.g. pleasant vs. unpleasant). The IAT is based on the 
rationale that if individuals have positive attitudes toward flowers but not insects, they should 
more easily (i.e. more quickly) associate pleasant words with flower names rather than with 
insect names. In contrast with explicit attitude measures, the IAT generally reflects more 
automatic cognitive processes due in part to its limited controllability (Asendorpf, Banse, & 
Mücke, 2002; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Kim, 2003). Although the IAT can be subject to some 
contextual variations, these variations do not seem to reflect intentional controlled processes (e. 
g. Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). Thus, most researchers using 
the IAT converge to claim that this method may be seen as an approximate measure of the     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         7
activation of object-evaluation associations when encountering an attitude object (De Houwer & 
Moors, 2007; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski, LeBel & Peters, 2007; Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2005), relatively impervious to strategic responding (Ferguson & Bargh, 2007; 
Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).  
The Relation between Implicit and Explicit Attitude Measures 
In light of the previous discussion, global attitudes, defined as object-evaluation 
associations stored in long-term memory, have arguably more influence on implicit attitude 
measures than on explicit attitude measures. From this perspective, investigations of the relation 
between implicit and explicit attitude measures seek answers to a substantive question: Under 
what circumstances do global attitudes drive explicit evaluations of objects? Since its inception, 
IAT research has reported diverging results for the correlation between implicit and explicit 
attitude measures (see Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006 for a review). According 
to Fazio and Olson (2003), the wide range of those correlations was symptomatic of the lack of a 
broader theoretical framework that would accommodate varying strengths in the relation 
between implicit and explicit attitude measures. Consequently, there has been a steady stream of 
research specifically dealing with the issue of implicit-explicit consistency (Hofmann et al., 
2005a; Karpinski et al., 2005; Nosek, 2005, 2007). A review of this literature suggests that 
research has investigated a host of potential moderators of the implicit-explicit relation, 
including factors related to research design, attitude structure, and evaluation context (Hofmann 
et al., 2005c). Research has also begun investigating the effect of individual differences on the 
implicit-explicit relation. The individual differences considered mainly focus on personal 
tendencies to elaborate on explicit evaluations for motives related to need for cognition (Florack, 
Scarabis, & Bless, 2001) and self-perception (Hofmann et al., 2005b), as well as various social     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         8
and self-presentational motives (Egloff & Schmukle, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2005; Nosek, 2005; 
Olson, Fazio & Hermann, 2007). The present research adopts a different perspective on 
individual differences and focuses on a more fundamental issue: How individual differences may 
affect the cognitive processes and underlying attitudinal structure upon which implicit and 
explicit attitude measures are based. We propose that one such individual difference affecting 
attitudinal structure is personal expertise with the attitude domain.   
Expertise and Its Effect on the Implicit-Explicit Relation: 
A Framework Based on Information Availability and Accessibility 
In the present research, we define expertise as “cognitive competence” (Sternberg & 
Frensch, 1992, p. 191). There is considerable evidence showing that experts’ knowledge of a 
domain is more abundant, more elaborate, and more efficiently organized than novices’ (Chase 
& Simon, 1973; Cooke, 1992; Wood, Rhodes, & Biek, 1995). We focus on two aspects of expert 
knowledge that may determine the effect of expertise on the implicit-explicit relation: the 
availability and accessibility of information about the object. Availability refers to whether or not 
information about the object is actually stored in long-term memory, and accessibility refers to 
the activation potential of the available information when making an explicit evaluation of the 
object (Higgins, 2000). Various types of information may be available and accessible in memory 
about a given object. We focus our investigation on the differential accessibility and availability 
of two types of information, attitudes and attributes (Carlston, 1980; Kardes, 1986). We now 
describe how existing research and theory can lead to two competing predictions of the effect of 
expertise on the implicit-explicit relation, depending on which type of information is available 
and/or accessible to individuals at the time of the explicit attitude measurement.  
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Compared to novices, experts in a domain have a greater availability of detailed attribute-
level information about objects belonging to that domain (Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi, 2006; 
Fiske & Kinder, 1981). Consequently, when experts are requested to evaluate a domain-relevant 
object, they may experience a fan effect (Anderson, 1983; Cooke, 1992). The fan effect suggests 
that as the quantity of information stored in memory increases, the likelihood that a specific 
piece of information will be retrieved if the object node is activated decreases. Thus, if expertise 
leads to greater availability of attribute-level information, the relative weight of attitudes in the 
total association network diminishes. For example, when asked to evaluate a car brand, car 
experts may activate many available detailed attributes about that specific brand, thus decreasing 
the relative accessibility of their attitudes. Evidence for this effect has been provided in studies 
showing that experts tend to base their explicit brand evaluations on multiple concrete product 
attributes whereas novices tend to use their global attitudes to form brand evaluations (Dillon, 
Madden, Kirmani, & Mukherjee, 2001). Furthermore, novices seem more prone to use general 
stereotypes rather than attribute information in explicit product evaluations, while the opposite 
seems to hold for experts (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987; Maheswaran, 1994). Thus, a possible fan 
effect may lead experts to rely less on their attitudes to form an explicit evaluation, leading to 
weaker implicit-explicit relations. In contrast to experts’ knowledge, novices’ knowledge is 
characterized by very few attribute associations about the object. Therefore, they are likely to 
base their explicit evaluations on more global attitudes (e.g., first impressions and stereotypes), 
leading to potentially stronger implicit-explicit relations. In summary, the information 
availability aspect of expertise results in a prediction of a negative moderating effect of expertise 
on the implicit-explicit relation, such that greater expertise may lead to a weaker implicit-explicit 
relation.     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         10
Expertise and the Accessibility of Global Attitudes 
There are two types of accessibility: Chronic, or long-term accessibility generally 
resulting from frequent exposure to a stimulus, and temporary, a short term readiness or 
activation potential of a certain construct (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). Experts may 
experience chronic accessibility of global attitudes due to their frequent exposure to evaluative 
situations (Wood et al., 1995). For example, car experts may readily report their global attitudes 
toward different car brands because they have been expressing those attitudes many times in a 
variety of contexts. Empirical evidence indeed shows that prior personal experience with the 
attitude object plausibly leads to more accessible attitudes, suggesting a higher implicit-explicit 
relation for experts than novices (Marsh, Johnson, & Scott-Sheldon, 2001). Research also attests 
that if attitudes are elaborated and personally important, there is a stronger implicit-explicit 
relation than if attitudes are weaker and less relevant for the person (Karpinski et al., 2005; 
Nosek, 2005).   
Consequently, contrary to our above conclusion that availability of detailed information 
can lead to the negative effect of expertise on the implicit-explicit relation, one could conclude 
that the accessibility of global attitudes can lead to the positive effect of expertise on the implicit-
explicit relation. The purpose of our framework is to integrate these two competing mechanisms 
by highlighting conditions under which one or the other dominates. As explained below, these 
conditions pertain to the specificity of the attitude object (which can influence the nature and 
quantity of information available) and to the characteristics of the evaluative context (which can 
influence the accessibility of different types of available information).      Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         11
Object Specificity and Information Availability 
Availability of attribute information can be influenced by the specificity of the attitude 
object being evaluated. Categorization theory holds that the number of attribute-based inferences 
varies depending on the specificity of the attitude object (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1975; 
Sujan, 1985). The more precisely defined an object is, the more attribute-based inferences people 
should be able to make about it. Thus, exemplars are more likely to lead to attribute-based 
inferences than categories. For instance, brands within a particular product category (e.g. 
Mercedes) should generate more attribute-level inferences than the product category itself (e.g., 
luxury cars). Because of the greater availability of attribute-level information, individuals would 
be more likely to use it when forming evaluations about exemplars than when forming 
evaluations about categories. Object specificity will therefore likely affect the influence of 
expertise on the implicit-explicit relation. If sufficient attribute knowledge about the object is not 
available (i.e., if level of object specificity is low), we propose that independently of expertise 
level, people will be likely to make attitude-based explicit evaluations about the object (leading 
to a higher implicit-explicit relation). However, if sufficient attribute knowledge about the object 
is conceptually available (i.e., if level of object specificity is high), then, as expertise increases, 
so will the likelihood of engaging in attribute-based processing. So, we propose that if object 
specificity is high, novices will engage in attitude-based processing (leading to a higher implicit-
explicit relation), but experts will engage in attribute-based processing (leading to a lower 
implicit-explicit relation). We test these predictions in Experiment 1(Footnote 2). 
Characteristics of the Evaluative Context and Information Accessibility 
Even if object specificity is high, we argue that specific aspects of the explicit 
evaluation’s context may favor either attitude-based or attribute-based evaluations. The nature of     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         12
the evaluative context is of key importance to our investigation because in most real life 
situations, an explicit judgment is rarely context-free. For example, individuals may be requested 
to make an explicit evaluation of car brands with different goals or instructions, either in private 
or public, under low or high time pressure, under low or high cognitive load, or under varying 
motivational levels. In addition, the nature of the evaluation may depend on whether the 
evaluation bears on a single focal object (e. g., a conversation with friends about the pros and 
cons of Mercedes cars) or whether the evaluation is part of a larger set of explicit attitude 
measures about multiple objects (e. g. a preference survey about several products and brands). 
These different evaluation contexts may weaken/strengthen the temporary accessibility of 
attitudes/attributes, making the effect of expertise on the implicit-explicit relation conditional on 
the nature of the evaluation context.   
We investigate two aspects of the evaluative context as potential factors leading to the 
temporary accessibility of different types of information (attitudes vs. attributes), and therefore 
leading to differential effects of expertise on the implicit-explicit relation. The first aspect is 
whether the evaluative context induces attitude-based or attribute-based processing through the 
instructions given to respondents prior to the explicit measurement task. Given experts’ 
extensive available knowledge, inducing different types of processing through experimental 
instructions could have the following effect: On the one hand, instructing experts to use their 
global attitudes should make attitudes more temporarily accessible, leading to higher implicit-
explicit relations. On the other hand, instructing experts to use attribute information in their 
explicit judgments should make attribute information more temporarily accessible, leading to 
lower implicit-explicit relations. However, we do not expect such differences to occur for 
novices because their attitude structures should be dominated by global attitudes. Regardless of     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         13
the type of information activated by the instructions, novices are likely to rely only on 
information that is predominantly available to them (i. e., global attitudes), leading to a high 
implicit-explicit relation. These predictions are investigated in Experiment 2.   
The second aspect of evaluative context investigated in Experiment 3 pertains to whether 
the explicit evaluation of a specific object is taken in isolation (single evaluation) or after several 
evaluations of various unrelated objects (multiple evaluations). In a single evaluation context, we 
should replicate the relationships expected in Experiments 1 and 2. In a multiple evaluation 
context, however, we expect a different pattern to emerge. When individuals form an evaluation, 
information that is temporarily accessible tends to be oversampled (e.g., Lavine, Huff, Wagner, 
& Sweeney, 1998; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988). Evaluations of unrelated objects along certain 
dimensions may therefore create a contextual influence on the ratings of the target object 
(Anderson & Lampel, 1965; Wyer, 1974; Wyer & Watson, 1969). We argue, however, that this 
contextual effect will likely influence experts and novices in different ways. 
We propose that due to their lack of knowledge and less chronically accessible attitudes 
about the object, novices’ explicit judgments could be easily influenced by the directionality of 
their prior evaluations. Research suggests that information made salient by the evaluative context 
can have an influence on reported evaluations, especially for individuals who do not have 
extensive knowledge about an object  (Lavine et al., 1998). Thus, their prior evaluations could 
bias their target evaluations and decrease the accessibility of their attitudes about the target 
object (e.g., if the unrelated object was given a “5” as an evaluation on a 1-5 scale, the target 
object would also get a “5”). Thus, novices may be more susceptible than experts to evaluating a 
target object in a manner consistent with their prior evaluations of unrelated objects (Fiske & 
Kinder, 1981; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988). In a multiple evaluation context, we would     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         14
therefore expect novices to have a low implicit-explicit relation. For experts, unrelated 
evaluations are unlikely to bias their chronically accessible attitudes about the target object. 
Rather, these prior evaluations may prime them to utilize a particular type of processing during 
the target task (Zbrodoff, 1999)—i.e., they may be primed to evaluate the target object based on 
their attitudes rather than engage in detailed attribute-based processing. If this reasoning is 
correct, we should observe a stronger implicit-explicit relation for experts than for novices in the 
multiple evaluation context. We tested this prediction in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 1 
The purpose of our first experiment is to investigate whether attribute information 
availability determined by object specificity differentially impacts the implicit-explicit relation 
for individuals with varying levels of expertise with the object. Our rationale is that if limited 
attribute information about the object is available in memory, which is the case for general 
categories, then expertise level will not make a difference on the way people evaluate the object. 
In such situations, both novices and experts will rely on their existing global attitudes about the 
object, evidenced by a high implicit-explicit relation at any level of expertise.   
However, if the object under consideration is more specific (such as a category’s 
exemplar), we expect experts to have a greater quantity of attribute knowledge available than 
novices. Thus, experts should be more likely to retrieve information other than global attitudes 
and use that information to arrive at an explicit attitude report. Therefore, higher levels of 
expertise are expected to lead to weaker implicit-explicit relations if object specificity is high.  
We chose cars as the superordinate category for our investigations. This choice was 
motivated by the presence of a wide range of categories (e.g., luxury cars, sports cars, SUVs) and 
exemplars (car brands) within categories. Object specificity was manipulated by presenting     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         15
either a category or an exemplar within the category to participants, following the procedures 
outlined below.   
Pretest 
To define appropriate objects and stimuli, 101 voluntary students participated in a pretest 
consisting of a word association task. Half of them were asked to list brands that were “most” 
and “least” luxurious in their view. As a result, the category luxury cars (vs. common cars) and 
the brand Mercedes (vs. Fiat) were chosen for the object specificity manipulation. The six most 
frequently cited luxury car brands and the six most frequently cited common car brands were 
selected as target stimulus items for the IAT in the category condition (see Appendix). The other 
half of the pretest sample was asked to list “any words that come to mind” about different 
brands, including Mercedes and Fiat. The purpose of this task was to elicit target stimulus items 
for the IAT in the brand condition. The six most frequently cited words pertaining to Mercedes 
and Fiat were selected (see Appendix).  
Pilot Study 
The purpose of this pilot study was to verify a basic assumption about the effect of 
information availability on the way experts vs. novices evaluate categories vs. exemplars. We 
sought to check whether experts indeed elaborated more on attribute information than novices 
when they were asked to produce explicit evaluations of exemplars, but not when asked to 
evaluate categories. Ninety undergraduate students were assigned to either the category condition 
(luxury cars, common cars) or brand condition (Mercedes, Fiat). Each participant completed a 
six-item, seven-point differential scale (unpleasant–pleasant, bad–good, dislike–like, ugly–
beautiful, unfavorable–favorable and awful–nice) to assess explicit judgments about each of the 
two attitude objects assigned to them. After each explicit attitude measure, participants wrote     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         16
down the reasons for their evaluation the object. Participants were then asked to self-code their 
own thoughts according to thought valence (positive/negative) and whether the thought reflected 
an attitude (described as an “overall opinion”) or an attribute (described as a “specific 
characteristic”). Individual expertise with cars was assessed using a four-item, seven-point scale, 
where higher scores meant greater expertise (Mitchell & Dacin, 1996): “How familiar are you 
with cars?,” “How clear an idea do you have about which characteristics are important in 
providing you usage satisfaction?,” “I know a lot about cars,” and “How would you rate your 
knowledge about cars relative to the rest of the population?” (α = 0.92). The summated score on 
this scale served as a global measure of expertise with cars (Footnote 3). 
As expected, in the category condition, level of expertise was unrelated to either the 
number of attitude-based thoughts (luxury cars: r = –.07, p = .65; common cars: r = .02, p = .85) 
or attribute-based thoughts (luxury cars: r = .22, p = .13; common cars: r = –.02, p = .87). In the 
brand condition, level of expertise was also unrelated to the number of attitude-based thoughts 
(Mercedes: r = .09, p = .57; Fiat: r = .10, p = .51). However, as hypothesized, the number of 
attribute-based thoughts was positively correlated with level of expertise in this condition 
(Mercedes: r = .48, p = .001; Fiat: r = .47, p = .002). These results confirm our theorizing about 
expertise, object specificity, and attribute information availability. Increasing levels of expertise 
seem to lead to the use of more attribute information when evaluating an exemplar, but not when 
evaluating a category. 
Method 
Materials. In the main experiment, all participants completed implicit and explicit 
measures of their attitudes toward either the categories or the brands presented to them, 
depending on their experimental condition. We then measured participants’ expertise regarding     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         17
cars using the self-reported scale described above. Finally, we assessed whether expertise exerted 
a differential influence on the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures for 
participants in the category condition versus participants in the brand condition. 
Participants and procedure. Eighty-eight undergraduate students participated in the 
experiment as part of a course requirement. They were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions reflecting either low object specificity (category) or high object specificity (brand). In 
the category condition, automatically activated attitudes were assessed with the standard IAT 
procedure developed by Greenwald et al. (1998), using the stimuli featured in the Appendix. 
Participants completed the luxury cars/common cars IAT implemented on Inquisit 1.33 software. 
They were instructed to sort words appearing in the middle of the computer screen into 
categories as quickly as they could. The words appeared in random order and were positive 
valence attributes (e.g. joy, pleasure), negative valence attributes (e.g. tragedy, pain), target 
items pertaining to luxury cars (e.g. Mercedes, BMW) and target items pertaining to common 
cars (e.g. Fiat, Hyundai). After practice blocks, participants sorted words in the compatible trial 
block (luxury cars and pleasant; common cars and unpleasant) and the incompatible trial block 
(luxury cars and unpleasant; common cars and pleasant); the order of these blocks was 
randomized.   
After completing the IAT, the same scale as in the pilot study was used to assess explicit 
evaluations about luxury cars and common cars. Subtracting the summated score for common 
cars from the summated score of luxury cars provided our explicit measure of attitudes toward 
luxury cars (vs. common cars). Individual expertise with cars was assessed using the four-item, 
seven-point scale used in the pilot study.     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         18
In the brand condition, participants followed a similar procedure as in the category 
condition, with the exception that their attitudes toward Mercedes (vs. Fiat) instead of luxury 
cars (vs. common cars) were assessed. Accordingly, we used the target labels Mercedes/Fiat and 
their respective target items in the IAT (see Appendix). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics. D-measures for the IAT effect were calculated following the 
improved scoring algorithm developed by Greenwald et al. (2003). Mean error rates in both IATs 
were low (4.15% for categories and 3.39% for brands); internal consistencies calculated as the 
correlation between D-measures in practice and trial blocks were within the ranges reported by 
Greenwald et al. (2003) with  r = .71, p < .0001 for categories and r = .57, p < .0001 for brands. 
Overall, participants revealed a preference for luxury cars (vs. common cars) on the IAT (M = 
.25, t(35) = 2.96, p = .006) and no preference for luxury cars (vs. common cars) on the explicit 
attitude scale (M = –1.06, t(35) = –.78, p = .441). Conversely, they showed no preference for 
Mercedes (vs. Fiat) on the IAT (M = –.04, t(51) = –.70, p = .487) and a preference for Mercedes 
(vs. Fiat) on the explicit attitude scale (M = 7.54, t(51) = 4.99, p < .0001).   
Main results. Multiple linear regression analysis with interaction terms was conducted 
following Aiken and West’s methods (1991). We mean-centered the data by subtracting the 
mean from each observation for all continuous variables. We then regressed explicit attitude 
measures on the IAT effect, expertise, object specificity (category: 0, brand: 1) and all the two-
way and three-way cross-products between these three independent variables. Results of this 
regression are reported in Table 1. The significant main effects of IAT and object specificity 
were qualified by a significant negative three-way interaction between IAT effect, expertise and 
object specificity. To further investigate this interaction, we conducted slope tests of the     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         19
regression line estimated in the category (brand) condition for novices (experts), as 
recommended by Aiken and West (1991). In the top panel of Figure 1, we present two regression 
lines estimated at different expertise levels in the category condition. The bold line corresponds 
to the regression slope estimated at low expertise (one standard deviation below the mean on the 
expertise scale) while the dotted line corresponds to the slope estimated at high expertise (one 
standard deviation above the mean on the same scale). Both of these slopes were significantly 
positive (t(87)  = 2.04, p = .044 and t(87)  = 2.07, p = .041), indicating that independently of 
expertise level, participants manifested a strong relation between their implicit and explicit 
attitude measures in the category condition. The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents two 
regression lines estimated at different expertise levels in the brand condition. The bold line 
corresponds to the regression slope estimated at low expertise; the positive slope of this line 
indicates that novices manifested a strong positive relation between implicit and explicit attitude 
measures in the car brand condition, too, t(87)  = 3.88, p = .0002). However, we obtained a 
marginally negative slope at high expertise (dotted line), suggesting no positive relation between 
implicit and explicit attitude measures for experts in this condition, t(87)  = –1.96, p = .053. 
Discussion 
The key insight emerging from the data is that the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitude measures is conditional on the interaction between object specificity and 
expertise. The findings suggest that the default relationship between implicit and explicit 
measures for novices is highly positive, irrespective of object specificity. For experts, the picture 
is different: the implicit-explicit relation is highly positive for categories but not for exemplars. 
Because of lack of sufficient specificity, the number of attributes about an object such as a broad 
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information is chronically accessible for experts, the possibility of attribute-based processing is 
low. It is likely that most people will therefore engage in attitude-based processing; that is, rely 
on their attitudes to evaluate those broadly defined objects. On the other hand, if an object is 
more specific (e. g. a car brand), increasing expertise levels leads to more attribute information 
available in memory that can be used to make an explicit evaluation.   
The purpose of experiments 2 and 3 is to further investigate the conditions under which 
expertise leads to a stronger or weaker implicit-explicit relation. These two studies examine the 
role of the context in which the explicit judgment is made on the temporary accessibility of 
global attitudes versus detailed attribute information. We focus on measurements of attitudes 
toward exemplars in order to conceptually maintain a high level of information availability 
across conditions and be able to investigate the effect of information accessibility. Taken 
together, these two experiments show that higher levels of expertise can impact the implicit-
explicit relation for exemplars in different ways depending on the information that the evaluative 
context makes most accessible (either attributes or attitudes). 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we investigate the nature of the explicit evaluative context in terms of 
its likelihood of inducing either attitude-based or attribute-based processing in explicit 
evaluations of exemplars. Many common evaluative situations typically cue either attitude-based 
or attribute-based processing; indeed, models of attitude-behavior processes suggest that 
contextual factors can lead to reliance on either attitudes or attributes in evaluation formation 
(Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999). We employed 
two experimental conditions, one of them designed to induce high attitude accessibility and 
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expected individuals to engage in attitude-based processing independently of their level of 
expertise. We expected a high implicit-explicit relation in that condition. In the high attribute 
accessibility condition, we expected a difference between novices and experts such that novices 
would continue to engage in attitude-based processing (because of their lack of available 
attribute information), and experts would engage in attribute-based processing (because of ample 
attribute information available in their memory). We therefore expected a strong implicit-explicit 
relation in this condition for novices and a weak such relation for experts, just as in the brand 
condition of Experiment 1.    
Method 
  Materials. The materials were similar to Experiment 1, with the following differences:  
participants only responded to brands and not categories; there was a filler task between the IAT 
and the explicit measure intended to reduce a potential carryover effect of the IAT on the explicit 
measure; and an experimental manipulation preceded the explicit evaluations as explained 
below. 
Participants and procedure. One-hundred eight undergraduate students participated in an 
experiment as part of a course requirement. They first completed the Mercedes/Fiat IAT used in 
Experiment 1, followed by a 20-minute unrelated filler task. Participants were then randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions: high attitude accessibility or high attribute accessibility. In the 
high attitude accessibility condition, explicit attitude measures were preceded by an instruction 
asking participants to focus on their global attitude toward the car brands before completing the 
explicit attitude scales. In the high attribute accessibility condition, explicit measures were 
preceded by instructions asking participants to think of a Mercedes car’s detailed characteristics 
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provided. They were then asked to evaluate the brand on the explicit scales on the basis of the 
thoughts they had just written down. The same procedure was followed for Fiat.   
After explicit attitude measures identical to Experiment 1, participants in both conditions 
responded to two questions on a 1 to 7 scale anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly 
agree): “To evaluate Mercedes and Fiat, I tried to think of the specific characteristics of each 
brand” and “To evaluate Mercedes and Fiat, I tried to think of my general attitude toward each 
brand”. Responses to these questions served as manipulation checks. We expected lower (higher) 
scores on the first (second) item for participants in the high attitude accessibility condition 
compared to participants in the high attribute accessibility condition. Participants ended the 
experimental session by completing the four-item expertise scale used in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics. D-measures of the IAT effect were calculated following the 
improved scoring algorithm developed by Greenwald et al. (2003). Mean error rate was 3.84%  
and internal consistency was r = .44, p < .0001. As in Experiment 1, participants showed no 
preference for Mercedes (vs. Fiat) on the IAT (M = .06, t(107) = 1.53, p = .129) and a clear 
preference for Mercedes (vs. Fiat) on the explicit attitude scale (M = 8.22, t(107) = 8.08, p < 
.0001).  
Main results. The attribute accessibility manipulation was successful in that participants 
in the high attribute accessibility (vs. high attitude accessibility) condition reported higher scores 
to the question “I tried to think of the specific characteristics of each brand” (M = 5.29 vs. M = 
4.52, F(1, 106) = 7.55, p = .007) and lower scores to the question “I tried to think of my general 
attitude toward each brand” (M = 5.36 vs. M = 5.88, F(1, 106) = 5.44, p = .022). Following the 
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from each observation for all continuous variables. We then regressed the explicit attitude 
measure on the IAT measure, expertise, accessibility type (attitude accessibility: 0; attribute 
accessibility: 1) and all the two-way and three-way cross-products between these three 
independent variables. Results of this regression are reported in Table 2. The main effect of the 
IAT measure was qualified by a negative three-way interaction between IAT measure, expertise 
and accessibility type. To further investigate this interaction, we conducted slope tests of the 
regression line estimated at high attitude accessibility (high attribute accessibility) for novices 
(experts). In the top panel of Figure 2, we present two regression lines estimated at different 
expertise levels in the high attitude accessibility condition. The bold line corresponds to the 
regression slope estimated at low expertise (one standard deviation below the mean on the 
expertise scale) and the dotted line corresponds to the slope estimated at high expertise (one 
standard deviation above the mean on the same scale). Both of these slopes were significantly 
positive (t(107) = 2.03, p = .045 and t(107) = 3.20, p = .002), indicating that, independently of 
expertise level, participants manifested a strong relation between their implicit and explicit 
attitude measures in the high attitude accessibility condition. The bottom panel of Figure 2 
presents two regression lines estimated at different expertise levels in the high attribute 
accessibility condition. The positive significant slope of the bold line for low expertise indicates 
that novices also manifested a strong positive relation between implicit and explicit attitude 
measures in the high attribute accessibility condition (t(107) = 3.10, p = .003). However, we 
obtained a non-significant slope at high expertise (dotted line), suggesting no positive relation 
between implicit and explicit attitude measures for experts in this condition (t(107) = .72, p = 
.473). 
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This study investigated an important contextual variable, the level of attribute versus 
attitude accessibility at the time the explicit evaluation was made. In the high attribute 
accessibility condition, we replicated the results obtained in Experiment 1 suggesting that experts 
elaborated on attributes to make an explicit exemplar evaluation, while novices seemed to rely 
on their attitudes to do so. This result further corroborates the proposition that as a default 
processing mode for exemplar evaluations, there is a weak implicit-explicit relation for experts 
and a high such relation for novices. In the high attitude accessibility condition, novices seemed 
to continue to rely on their attitudes in explicit evaluations. Experts, too, seemed to switch to 
attitude-based processing in their explicit evaluations. Taken together, findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that, for exemplars, experts have both attitudes and attributes 
available, but the accessibility of those two types of information may vary depending on whether 
the evaluative context cues attributes or attitudes.  
Experiment 3 
  This experiment examines the effect of another contextual factor on the differential 
accessibility of attitudes versus attributes during explicit evaluations. A key purpose of this 
experiment relates to novices. Our first two experiments consistently showed positive implicit-
explicit relations for novices in all conditions investigated. From the theoretical perspective 
espoused in this research, these findings suggest that irrespective of the object and its evaluation 
context, novices strongly relied on global attitudes to make an explicit evaluation. However, 
there may be situations where novices do not use their attitudes to make an explicit evaluation 
about an exemplar. Instead, they may rely on other mechanisms to produce an explicit 
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even for novices. Experiment 3 seeks to investigate an aspect of the evaluation context that may 
produce such situations. 
The factor under consideration in this study is whether the explicit evaluation is a stand-
alone single evaluation or whether the explicit evaluation is part of a larger set of evaluations 
(e.g., the typical case of a survey), in which case the focal evaluation is preceded by several 
unrelated explicit attitude measures. In a standard single evaluation context, novices and experts 
should behave like in the brand condition of Experiment 1: novices would rely on their attitudes 
while experts, subject to a fan effect, would engage in more detailed processing and increasingly 
rely on attributes to make an explicit evaluation. We should thus observe a high implicit-explicit 
relation for novices and a low such relation for experts in a single evaluation context. In a 
multiple evaluation context, we would expect attitude accessibility to offset the fan effect for 
experts because multiple attitude reports would cue attitude-based processing rather than 
attribute-based processing. In such a context, experts would produce a high implicit-explicit 
relation. However, if novices indeed have weaker, less chronically accessible attitudes than 
experts, then the unrelated evaluations that precede the focal object evaluation may interfere with 
their retrieval of the focal attitudes. This would be evidenced by a potential carryover of the 
attitude responses from the prior evaluations to the focal object; in other words, those attitude 
reports may serve as primes that reduce attitude accessibility toward the focal object for novices. 
In such a context, novices could produce a low implicit-explicit relation. Experiment 3 was 
designed to investigate this possibility. 
Method 
  Materials. Materials were similar to those used in Experiment 2, the only difference 
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Participants and procedure. Eighty-two undergraduate students participated in this 
experiment for partial course credit. They first completed the Mercedes/Fiat IAT used in the 
previous experiments, followed by a 20-minute unrelated filler task. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions reflecting either single or multiple explicit attitude 
evaluations. In the single evaluation condition, participants completed an unrelated task that did 
not involve evaluating any objects and then completed the target explicit attitude evaluation 
without specific instructions (identical to the conditions in Experiment 1). In the multiple 
evaluation condition, participants first completed explicit attitude measures on four unrelated 
objects (camera, TV set, cell phone and digital personal organizer). Specifically, participants saw 
a picture of the object, followed by the same six-item attitude scale used in the previous 
experiments. This task was followed by the explicit attitude measures on the same scale for the 
focal brands, Mercedes and Fiat. Participants in both experimental conditions ended the session 
by completing the four-item expertise scale used in the previous experiments. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics. D-measures of the IAT effect were calculated following the 
improved scoring algorithm developed by Greenwald et al. (2003). Mean error rate was 3.77%  
and internal consistency was r = .48, p < .0001. As in the previous experiments, participants 
showed no preference for Mercedes (vs. Fiat) on the IAT (M = .00, t(81) = .06, p = .952) and a 
clear preference for Mercedes (vs. Fiat) on the explicit attitude scale (M = 7.22, t(81) = 7.22, p < 
.0001).  
Main results. Following the same procedures as in previous experiments, we first mean-
centered the data by subtracting the mean from each observation for all continuous variables. We 
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(single: 0, multiple: 1) and all the two-way and three-way cross-products between these three 
independent variables. Results of this regression are reported in Table 3. The main effect of the 
IAT measure was qualified by a positive three-way interaction between IAT measure, expertise 
and evaluation type. To further investigate this interaction, we conducted slope tests of the 
regression line estimated in single (multiple) evaluation for novices (experts). In the top panel of 
Figure 3, we present two regression lines estimated at different expertise levels in the high 
attitude accessibility condition. The bold line corresponds to the regression slope estimated at 
low expertise (one standard deviation below the mean on the expertise scale) while the dotted 
line corresponds to the slope estimated at high expertise (one standard deviation above the mean 
on the same scale). Note the pattern of the regression lines parallels the findings in the brand 
condition of Experiment 1, which was similar to the present single evaluation condition (see 
Figure 1, bottom panel). Thus, novices manifested a strong relation between their implicit and 
explicit attitude measures in the single evaluation condition (t(81) = 2.69, p = .009); for experts, 
however, there was no positive association between implicit and explicit attitude measures in that 
condition (t(81) = –.01, p = .922). The bottom panel of Figure 3 presents two regression lines 
estimated at different expertise levels in the multiple evaluation condition. In this condition, the 
pattern of results is reversed: We observe a significant positive implicit-explicit relation for 
experts (t(81) = 2.57, p = .012) but not for novices (t(81) = .39, p = .698).  
We also checked for support of our theorizing with regard to the differential impact that 
the prior unrelated evaluations have on novices versus experts. If our theorizing is correct, we 
should observe a carryover effect for novices but not for experts, emerging as a significant 
relationship between the averaged unrelated product evaluations and the focal explicit 
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attitude measures on the averaged unrelated product evaluations (t(43) = .96, p = .342), expertise 
(t(43)  = –.97, p = .338) and the unrelated product evaluations × expertise cross-product (t(43) = 
–2.21, p = .033, R
2 = . 25). This latter interaction was probed at low vs. high expertise levels (one 
SD below/above the mean) in Figure 4. Novices’ explicit attitude measures were strongly related 
to the previous unrelated product evaluations (t(43) = 2.45, p = .018); however, there was no 
such relationship for experts (t(43)  = –1.05, p = .299). These results support our hypothesis 
about the presence of an effect that carries over from unrelated product evaluations for novices 
but not experts, possibly limiting the accessibility of novices’ focal attitudes.   
Discussion 
One objective of this experiment was to show that novices can also manifest a low 
implicit-explicit correspondence in exemplar evaluations. We proposed that this would only 
occur in contexts where novices do not rely on their global attitudes toward the target object to 
form an explicit evaluation. To induce such a context, we manipulated the number of evaluations 
participants made prior the focal object evaluation. We expected that if multiple unrelated 
evaluations preceded the focal object evaluation, then these evaluative responses would carry 
over to the focal object, potentially limiting novices’ accessibility of focal attitudes. Experiment 
3 provided evidence for this process and indeed showed a low implicit-explicit relation for 
novices in multiple evaluations. No such effects were observed for experts, whose highly 
accessible attitudes seemed to prevent them from being influenced by this carryover effect. 
Instead, the unrelated evaluations seemed to act for experts as cues to engage in attitude-based 
processing; that is, to rely on their attitudes to form an explicit evaluation of the focal exemplar.    
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General Discussion 
This research attempts to further our understanding about how individual differences can 
influence the relation between implicit and explicit attitude measures (Nosek, 2007). Taken 
together, our three experiments provide evidence for expertise as an important individual 
difference moderating the implicit-explicit relation. Our availability/accessibility framework 
reconciles two opposing predictions for the direction of the effect of expertise on the implicit-
explicit relation. We viewed attitudes as object-evaluation associations in memory that may or 
may not be available, and may or may not be accessible in memory depending on the context of 
the explicit evaluation (Fazio, 1995). We proposed expertise as a person factor shaping the 
attitudinal representations of objects in terms of availability/accessibility of relevant information 
in memory. We also proposed that experts, compared to novices, have more information 
available/accessible about their object of expertise, provided that this object is specific enough (i. 
e. an exemplar vs. a category). Under standard conditions of implementation (a single object 
evaluation without particular instructions), it appears that both novices and experts rely on their 
attitudes to make an explicit evaluation of a broad category, leading to a strong implicit-explicit 
relation. Under the same conditions, however, novices and experts differ in the way they 
evaluate specific exemplars: experts engage in relatively detailed processing, whereby in 
addition to their attitudes, they may also rely on their attribute knowledge to form explicit 
evaluations. Such a process was not evidenced for novices. These findings were consistently 
replicated across the three experiments. We therefore propose that in standard evaluations of 
exemplars, there should be a strong implicit-explicit relation for novices and a weak relation for 
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We showed that expertise does not exert such a differential effect if the instructions 
preceding the explicit evaluation clearly cue attitude-based processing. In those situations, a high 
implicit-explicit relation was observed independently of expertise level. Finally, we showed that 
some evaluative contexts may actually produce a low implicit-explicit relation for novices. 
Those contexts may lead to lower attitude accessibility for novices (e.g., when there is a 
carryover effect from prior unrelated evaluations). In summary, we show in three experiments 
that depending on specific characteristics of the object and its evaluative context, increasing 
levels of expertise can lead to either weaker or stronger implicit-explicit relations. We now 
discuss how our research relates to prior work on the implicit-explicit relation and to alternative 
attitude conceptualizations. 
Category vs. Exemplar Evaluations 
IAT research has often used categories as target objects (Hofmann et al., 2005a; 
Poehlman et al., 2006). For example, Nosek’s (2005) extensive analysis of web-based IAT data 
on 57 objects (most of which included categories like democrats-republicans, vegetables-meat 
and cats-dogs) found a median correlation of .48 between implicit and explicit attitude measures. 
Given that people with various backgrounds could participate in those IATs, it is probable that 
participants had heterogeneous expertise levels with the target objects. Thus, the correlations 
observed by Nosek are compatible with our argument that if object specificity is low (like for 
categories), then independently of expertise level, a substantial implicit-explicit correspondence 
is expected. For the purposes of external validity, it would be important to verify that our 
predictions about the interaction of expertise and object specificity on the implicit-explicit 
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Lambert, Payne, Ramsey, and Shaffer (2005) reported that perceived group variability 
moderated the relation between implicit and explicit measures of impression formation toward a 
person. Their experiments demonstrate that if members of a target category are perceived as 
homogenous, then the implicit-explicit correspondence is high; however, weaker correspondence 
is observed if members of a target category are perceived as heterogeneous. Our studies actually 
show that the implicit-explicit correspondence tends to be stronger for categories than for 
exemplars. Lambert et al.’s (2005) findings suggest that group variability may moderate the 
interaction between object specificity and expertise on the implicit-explicit relation. We may 
therefore assume that the categories we used in Experiment 1 (luxury cars, common cars) were 
perceived by participants as relatively homogenous. Although outside the scope of the present 
paper, the proposition that less homogenous groups may lead to weaker implicit-explicit 
correspondence at the category level is certainly worth investigating in future research. 
Expertise and Attitude Strength/Importance 
Our conceptualization of expertise and its effect on attitudinal representations bears 
similarity with research investigating the effect of attitude dimensions on the implicit-explicit 
relation. Nosek (2005) found attitude strength to be a moderator of the implicit-explicit relation 
and Karpinski et al. (2005) established attitude importance to affect this relation. Attitude 
strength and importance are close constructs and these studies found that as attitude 
strength/importance increases, so does the relation between implicit and explicit attitude 
measures. There is considerable evidence that strong attitudes are characterized by higher 
accessibility than weak attitudes (Fazio, 1995). For this reason, our proposition about higher 
levels of expertise leading to more accessible attitudes also suggests that higher levels of 
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for this process as experts’ object-related attitudes proved impervious to distracting 
manipulations such as unrelated attitude reports. Novices, on the other hand, because of their 
relatively weakly held attitudes, were strongly affected by such manipulations and as a result, 
were unable to retrieve those attitudes to form an evaluation. However, the fact that Experiments 
1 and 2 found high implicit-explicit correlations for novices should not be interpreted as an 
indication of potentially strong attitudes held by those participants. Rather, as we suggested, the 
only piece of object-related information that novices may rely on when forming an explicit 
evaluation is their global attitudes, even if those are relatively weak compared to experts’.   
Expertise and Evaluative Distinctiveness 
Evaluation distinctiveness refers to the idiosyncrasy of an individual’s judgment 
compared to the social norm. Nosek (2005) found that distinctive evaluations were related to a 
greater implicit-explicit correspondence than normative evaluations. In light of our findings, it 
seems that there are promising avenues for future experiments to study the relation between 
expertise and the normative character of an evaluation and how this relation can impact the 
implicit-explicit consistency. Indeed, do increasing expertise levels lead to more and more 
personalized judgments that are more and more different from a social norm? Or is the opposite 
effect more plausible? For example, Nosek (2005) argues that sports fans (that is, experts in their 
favorite sport) may set the norm with their attitudes as opinion leaders. Future investigations are 
needed to clarify the conceptual link between expertise and evaluation distinctiveness and how 
these two factors may potentially interact on the implicit-explicit relation.   
Expertise and Constructionist Attitude Models 
  Researchers have advanced several conceptualizations of attitudes, including the view of 
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and the view of attitudes as temporary constructions (e.g., Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 
2005; Ferguson & Bargh, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Wilson & Hodges, 1992). Our 
framework of how expertise influences the implicit-explicit relationship via availability and 
accessibility of knowledge builds on the view of attitudes as structures held in long-term 
memory. From this perspective, as discussed throughout this paper, global evaluations of objects 
could be stored and retrieved by either novices or experts as needed, or individuals could instead 
retrieve the object’s  attributes and then integrate that information to form an explicit evaluation. 
Although the view of attitudes as temporary constructions can be used to explain most of our 
results, we find our data to be more easily explained by the view of attitudes as structures in long 
term memory.   
Thus, a constructionist view of our data would argue that when individuals perform the 
IAT, they do not tap into a stored attitude toward the object in question. For instance, recent 
constructionist conceptualizations of implicit measurements argue that “automatic attitudes 
would be more appropriately understood as unintentionally activated evaluations of ‘object-
centered contexts’” (Ferguson & Bargh, 2007, p. 217). According to an object-centered context 
approach, attitude measurements are the result of the integration of multiple pieces of 
information that are activated when the test is performed, not just the activation of a global 
attitude link between the object and an evaluation. Following this framework, the lower 
correlations between implicit and explicit measures for experts could be due to their greater 
available knowledge. The likelihood of exactly the same knowledge being activated in the 
context of two different measures is low relative to novices, who do not have as much available 
knowledge, so for them the difference between the first and the second test may not be as 
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additional metacognitive processing/second-guessing that would alter the unconscious evaluation 
in a two-stage process (Wilson et al., 2000).  
If we were to interpret our data following this approach, the difference between novices 
and experts would not be due to novices relying on their global evaluations and experts relying 
on detailed attribute information during the explicit attitude measure. Instead, the difference 
would be due to experts’ attitudes being more context-sensitive, and thus changing over time to a 
greater degree than novices’. This explanation could be proposed in Experiment 1 and could also 
be used to explain Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, the lower availability of knowledge in the 
category condition, even for experts, would lead to less variability in activated context across 
measurements, so experts would have higher implicit-explicit correlations in the category 
condition than in the brand condition. In Experiment 2, the context-activation explanation could 
reasonably be used to explain our data: experts have more attribute knowledge, so when they are 
encouraged to use it, there will probably be more variability across measurement tasks, leading 
to lower correlations than if respondents were encouraged to base their explicit evaluations on 
global attitudes. The application of object-centered contexts to our data may be less 
straightforward to explain the findings in Experiment 3. We therefore believe that an explanation 
based on the accessibility of global attitudes versus attribute information, as advanced in this 
paper, presents itself as more parsimonious than an explanation based on object-centered 
contexts. 
Expertise and the Dual-Attitude Model 
Another model of attitudes that has been used to explain the relationship between implicit 
and explicit measures of attitudes is the dual-attitude model (Wilson et al., 2000). The model 
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explicit. The implicit attitude could be “activated automatically, whereas the explicit one requires 
more capacity and motivation to retrieve from memory. When people are able to retrieve AE, it 
can override AI, such that they report AE. When people do not have the capacity or motivation to 
retrieve AE, they report AI” (Wilson et al., 2000, p. 104). According to the dual-attitude model, 
explicit attitudes are more susceptible to changes over time and to context effects; implicit 
attitudes tend to be more stable over time.  
Our data is consistent with the main principles of this model. For example, novices could 
have formed only an implicit attitude and use it both in the IAT and the explicit task. Experts are 
more likely than novices to have more than one attitude stored in memory because of their 
extensive knowledge about the object. For example, experts could have an implicit attitude 
toward the brands at hand based mostly on the brand image communicated by the companies, 
and an explicit attitude based on the individuals’ own brand attribute evaluations stemming from 
personal experience. Experts are also more likely than novices to have the capacity to retrieve the 
explicit attitude when required in the explicit task. Thus, we could think of the implicit attitude 
as the “default” attitude (Fabrigar et al., 2005), which is then revised with the explicit attitude 
when individuals have the capacity (i.e., available knowledge) or motivation to do so during an 
explicit task.  Experts, therefore, would be able to revise their implicit attitudes through 
elaboration and activation of available and accessible knowledge, leading to lower implicit-
explicit correlations than novices.   
Hence, our availability/accessibility framework for the effect of expertise on the implicit-
explicit relation could work with the dual attitude model, too. Experiment 1’s data could be 
explained in that categories are not as likely to have two attitudes connected to them because 
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attitudes reported in the explicit measure should be similar to those emerging from the IAT, for 
both experts and novices. In the brand condition, however, experts are likely to have formed at 
least two different attitudes, given the extensive elaboration to which the attitude object is 
submitted to. Therefore, expertise will lead to lower implicit-explicit correlations for exemplars 
but not for categories. In Experiment 2, our manipulations during the explicit task could have 
motivated experts to retrieve either an attitude based on global impressions (the implicit attitude) 
versus another attitude based more on attribute evaluations (the explicit attitude), leading to our 
results. In Experiment 3, experts could have been primed to retrieve either their implicit attitudes 
(in the multiple evaluation condition) or left to their own devices to respond based on explicit 
attitudes in the single evaluation condition, resulting in our obtained pattern of results. In 
conclusion, we believe the dual attitude model can accommodate our results, too.   
As stated by Gawronski (2007), scholars studying implicit cognition have adhered to 
different theoretical paradigms on the attitude construct. We built on the view of attitudes as 
object-evaluation associations to propose mechanisms about the effect of expertise on the 
implicit-explicit relation. However, the findings reported in this research could help further our 
understanding of the links between implicit and explicit attitude measures under the lenses of 
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Footnotes 
1. To make a parallel with the literature on judgments, we argue that explicit evaluations 
are in essence judgments. The literature identifies two types of judgments, stimulus-based and 
memory-based judgments (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Lingle & Ostrom, 1979; Schul, 1986). 
Stimulus-based judgments are those that are made in presence of or immediately after exposure 
to the stimuli that can be relied on to form a judgment. Memory-based judgments are those that 
are made significantly after exposure to the stimuli and rely on information retrieved from long-
term memory. The present paper examines the types of information that are used in making 
memory-based judgments; that is, memory-based explicit attitude measures. 
2. Theoretically, some experts could only retrieve attitude-consistent attributes from 
memory at the time the explicit evaluation is requested, in which case we would observe a high 
implicit-explicit correspondence. This could only happen if an expert had a very extreme 
(positive or negative) attitude about the object. For example, if an expert had an extremely 
positive attitude toward Mercedes, then this person would only have positive attributes available 
at the time of the explicit evaluation (e. g., reliable, durable, comfortable). However, the 
likelihood of this extreme situation is rather low because experts’ extensive knowledge base will 
probably also contain highly accessible attribute information that is negative (e. g., expensive, 
long service deadlines, snobbishness). It is thus improbable that experts’ would have very 
extreme (negative or positive) attitudes about their objects of expertise.  
 3. Extant research indicates that self-reported expertise measures and more objective 
knowledge/competence assessments are strongly related (Mitchell & Dacin, 1996). Additionally, 
to assess a potential distinction between category-level and brand-specific expertise, a pretest 
was conducted whereby ninety-six participants completed the four-item expertise scale used in     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         38
Experiment 1 followed by the same scale applied to Mercedes and Fiat. Scale reliabilities as 
assessed by Cronbach’s alpha were the following: Expertise with cars (α = .93), expertise with 
Mercedes (α = .92) and expertise with Fiat (α = .91). The category expertise scale was highly 
correlated with both the Mercedes (r = .78, p < .0001) and Fiat expertise scales (r = .66, p < 
.0001). Taken together, the twelve items of the three scales loaded on one dominant factor 
explaining 64.2 % of total variance. We concluded on the basis of these findings that, in the 
present context, there was no reason to study the effect of brand-specific expertise as a construct 
distinct from category expertise.       Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         39
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 Appendix 









   
Pleasant Luxury  cars  Mercedes 
   
Peace Ferrari  Stuttgart 
Paradise Mercedes  Benz 
Joy Jaguar  SLK 
Love BMW  Daimler 
Pleasure Porsche  Germany 
Happiness Rolls-Royce  German 
   
Unpleasant Common  cars  Fiat 
   
Disaster Fiat  Turin 
Grief Renault  Punto 
Accident Citroën  Panda 
Pain Peugeot  Agnelli 
Bad Skoda  Italy 
Agony Hyundai  Italian 
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Table 1 
Explicit attitude measure regressed on the implicit attitude measure, expertise and object 




Standardized regression coefficients 
  
IAT effect  .29* 
Expertise   .25 
Object specificity   .53** 
IAT effect × expertise  .00 
IAT effect × object specificity  –.22 
Expertise × object specificity  –.15 
IAT effect × expertise × object specificity   –.44** 
R
2 .45 
N  88 
  
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         49
Table 2 
Explicit attitude measure regressed on the implicit attitude measure, expertise and accessibility 




Standardized regression coefficients 
  
IAT effect  .45** 
Expertise   .06 
Accessibility type   .04 
IAT effect × expertise  .14 
IAT effect × accessibility type  –.07 
Expertise × accessibility type  .12 
IAT effect × expertise × accessibility type  –.32* 
R
2 .23 
N  108 
  
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01.     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         50
Table 3 
Explicit attitude measure regressed on the implicit attitude measure, expertise and evaluation 




Standardized regression coefficients 
  
IAT effect  .35* 
Expertise   .05 
Evaluation type   –.06 
IAT effect × expertise  –.32 
IAT effect × evaluation type  –.05 
Expertise × evaluation type  .02 
IAT effect × expertise × evaluation type  .38* 
R
2 .17 
N  82 
  
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01.     Expertise and the Implicit-Explicit Relation         51
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1.  Explicit attitude measure as a function of the implicit attitude measure, expertise and 
object specificity in Experiment 1. 
Figure 2.  Explicit attitude measure as a function of the implicit attitude measure, expertise and 
attribute accessibility in Experiment 2. 
Figure 3.  Explicit attitude measure as a function of the implicit attitude measure, expertise and 
evaluation type in Experiment 3. 
Figure 4.  Explicit attitude measure as a function of the unrelated product evaluations and 
expertise in the multiple evaluation condition of Experiment 3. 
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